Abstract: Considering the significant policy losses against bribery, it can appear as if organisational actors collectively conspire to keep bribe markets alive. Far from it, however, I will talk about how social incentives discourage organisational actors from sharing information about their bribe-taking exploits with each other. This tendency against disclosure makes it costly and difficult for them to coordinate on bribery. As a result, bribery is more likely to be unevenly distributed, uncoordinated, and no where near normalised inside organisations. I will talk about the theoretical, empirical, and policy implications of my findings for how we think about and address bribery inside organisations. In the first half of my talk, I will focus on how I collected data on bribery, a phenomenon that is hard-to-see and hard-to-document. The second half of Dr. Dakhlallah’s talk will focus on the subject reflected in the title of her talk.
Speaker: Prof.
Diana Dakhlallah from McGill University. https://www.mcgill.ca/desautels/diana-dakhlallah
Prof. Dakhlallah received her PhD from Stanford University. She is an assistant professor of organizational behavior at the Desautels Faculty of Management, McGill University. Her research crosses organisational theory, political economy, economic sociology, and global health. She is one of the very few scholars who combine in depth field work, survey methods, and field experimental methods to study how social incentives structure bribe markets. The findings of Dr. Dakhlallah’s research has important implications for our theories of misconduct inside organisations and the policy interventions we design.